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THE RATIONAL/NON-RATIONAL
DISTINCTION IN PLATO’S REPUBLIC
TODD STUART GANSON
Plato ’s division of the soul in Republic 10 di·ers from the divi-
sion in book 4 in a couple of obvious ways. First, the argument in
book 10 is an argument for two parts of the soul, while the argu-
ment in book 4 defends a tripartition of the soul. Second, while the
argument for tripartition at 436–41 focuses on strife among desires,
the argument for bipartition at 602–3 introduces examples of con-
ﬂict among beliefs. In spite of these di·erences, the two discussions
seem to share the common goal of drawing a contrast between ra-
tional and non-rational psychological states.1 My concern here is
with this common goal of the two discussions. I shall be defending
an interpretation of Plato’s distinction between the rational and
non-rational.
The arguments for dividing the soul in book 4 have received far
more attention than those in book 10,2 but there is a certain danger
involved in attempting to understand either text in isolation from
the other.3 In both passages Plato hopes to establish the presence
of non-rational psychological states in humans, and there is every
reason to suppose that he takes the desires and beliefs in question
ã Todd Stuart Ganson 2009
Many thanks to Jessica Moss and Brad Inwood for insightful written comments and
to Dorit Ganson for helpful discussion of the philosophical issues.
1 Plato’s logismos/alogiston distinction ﬁgures prominently in both passages: see
439 d and 602 e–604 d.
2 It is common for discussions of Plato’s division of the soul to make no mention
of Plato’s arguments in book 10. I point out, as examples, the discussions which
have had the greatest inﬂuence on my understanding of Plato’s division: J. M.
Cooper, ‘Plato’s Theory of Human Motivation’, History of Philosophy Quarterly,
1 (1984), 3–21; T. Irwin, Plato’s Moral Theory (Oxford, 1977), ch. 7; id., Plato’s
Ethics (Oxford, 1995), ch. 13.
3 Irwin’s identiﬁcation of non-rationality with good-independence illustrates the
pitfalls of focusing too narrowly on book 4 (see Plato’s Moral Theory, 78 and 192).
Surely Plato does not suppose that non-rational beliefs are non-rational in virtue
of their good-independence.
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to be non-rational in the same sense. Accordingly, our understand-
ing of the conclusions reached in book 4 should be responsive to
what is said in book 10, and vice versa. Ideally, we want an in-
terpretation of the rational/non-rational distinction that ﬁts both
texts.
What accounts, then, for the relative neglect of the division in
book 10 on the part of those interested in Plato’s distinction be-
tween the rational and non-rational? There is, of course, the fact
that the argument in book 4 lies at the heart of Plato’s moral
psychology and his response to Glaucon’s challenge, whereas the
argument in book 10 ﬁgures in an attack on poetry that seems
somewhat peripheral to the central project of the Republic. Fur-
ther, some have thought that in book 10 Plato is arguing for some
sort of division within the rational part, not a division between
the rational and non-rational as in book 4.4 Yet another factor,
I suspect, is that philosophers ﬁnd Plato’s appeal to conﬂicting
desires in book 4 much more promising philosophically than his
appeal to conﬂicting beliefs in book 10. The latter argument is seen
more as an embarrassment best left aside. My overarching goal
here is to counter this assessment of Plato’s argument. Plato’s at-
tempt to distinguish rational from non-rational cognition should
be recognized as one of the more impressive moments in the Re-
public.
But whatever the sources of past neglect may be, in the last few
years the trend has changed.ConsiderﬁrstHendrikLorenz’s recent
bookThe Brute Within, which has an entire chapter devoted to the
crucial argument in book 10 at 602–3.5 Lorenz spends most of the
chapter discrediting the view that Plato is here dividing reason into
two parts. He o·ers a compelling defence of the idea that Plato
is arguing for ‘a division between reason on the one hand and a
non-rational part on the other’.6 But after showing that book 10 is
in this respect consonant with book 4, Lorenz leaves us wondering
what, exactly, this division between the rational and non-rational
amounts to. In his treatment of the discussion of appetitive desire
in book 4, Lorenz concludes that the rational part is distinctive
because of its capacity for means–end reasoning—it is precisely
4 For a comprehensive discussion of this issue see H. Lorenz, The Brute Within:
Appetitive Desire in Plato and Aristotle (Oxford, 2006), ch. 5. Lorenz o·ers a com-
pelling response to the suggestion that Plato is dividing the rational part.
5 Ibid. 6 Ibid. 59–60.
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this form of reasoning that is lacking in the non-rational, appetitive
part.7 However, when the topic turns to book 10 and non-rational
beliefs, Lorenz does not tell us how to extend this account of non-
rationality to the case of belief. He does say in passing that our
non-rational side forms beliefs uncritically,8 but he never explains
what makes non-rational beliefs non-rational.
Of course, it is always possible that Plato has changed the sense
of ‘rational’ as the topic moves from desire to belief. It is unlikely,
however, that Lorenzwants to propose an interpretation along these
lines. As he notes, ‘book10 . . . contains a numberof back-references
to the argument for tripartition of the soul in book 4, all of which
suggest continuity and none of which as much as hints at revision’.9
Plato is evidently employing the same vocabulary to draw the same
kind of contrast in both texts, a contrast between rational and non-
rational psychological states.10 With his appeal to conﬂict among
beliefs in book 10, Plato is attempting to illustrate the same type
of division he uncovered among desires through his examples of
mental conﬂict in book 4.11
Lorenz has advanced discussion of Plato’s division of the soul
considerably by demonstrating continuity between Plato’s aims in
book 4 and book 10. What is needed still is an account of what,
exactly, Plato is arguing for in these texts. What is this distinc-
tion between the rational and non-rational that applies as much to
beliefs as to desires?
In her recent paper ‘Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Di-
vision of the Soul’ Jessica Moss confronts this question head on,
developing a novel approach to Plato’s distinction:
. . . we discover in Book 10 that what it is for a part of the soul to be
non-rational, with all that that entails for its ethical status, is for it to ac-
7 Ibid., ch. 4.
8 Ibid. 71. For the view that our non-rational side uncritically endorses appear-
ances, see also J. Annas, An Introduction to Plato’s Republic [Introduction] (Oxford,
1981), 131; R. Barney, ‘Appearances and Impressions’, Phronesis, 37 (1992), 283–
313 at 286–8; and J. Moss, ‘Appearances and Calculations: Plato’s Division of the
Soul’, Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 34 (2008), 35–68.
9 Lorenz, The Brute Within, 71.
10 See T. Penner, ‘Thought and Desire in Plato’ [‘Thought and Desire’], in G.
Vlastos (ed.), Plato, ii. Ethics, Politics, and Philosophy of Art and Religion (Notre
Dame, 1978), 96–118 at 100–1, and Moss, ‘Appearances and Calculations’, 36–7.
11 Since Plato is defending a bipartition in book 10, there is nothing in book 10
that parallels the distinction in book 4 between appetite and spirit, nothing akin to
Leontius’ struggle at 439 e–440 a.
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cept unreﬂectively that things are just as they appear to be, while what
it is for the rational part to be rational, with all that that entails for its
ethical status, is for it to be able to transcend appearances by calculat-
ing how things really are. These are the deﬁning features of rational-
ity and non-rationality, which unify and explain the various traits of the
parts of the soul and their various characterizations throughout the dia-
logue.12
Book 10 reveals that the non-rational side of the soul is limited
to cognizing appearances—it is incapable of weighing evidence or
calculating which option is best.13 What non-rational beliefs and
desires have in common is that they are uncritical responses to
appearances. The non-rational part just accepts as true however
things appear to be and desires whatever appears good. One inter-
esting consequence of this approach is that Moss is committed to
rejecting the familiar view that Plato’s appetitive desires are good-
independent (i.e. having an appetite for something does not involve
or depend upon cognizing it as good).14
In what follows I shall be developing a very di·erent approach
to Plato’s distinction between the rational and non-rational, one
in line with the view that appetites are good-independent. After
setting out my reading, I raise some di¶culties forMoss’s account.
I conclude with a positive assessment of Plato’s strategy for distin-
guishing rational and non-rational parts of the soul.
I
At Republic 602–3 Plato observes that someone subject to a visual
illusion may at the same time make a correct judgement regarding
what she sees. Plato takes these to be cases of partially deceptive
illusions: although the subject has a correct judgement in the cir-
cumstances, she simultaneously holds a belief opposed to this cor-
12 ‘Appearances and Calculations’, 40.
13 I shall be assuming here, with Moss, that Plato thinks of the appetitive part
as wholly devoid of the ability to make calculations. For an alternative reading,
see J. Moline, ‘Plato on the Complexity of the Psyche’, Archiv f•ur Geschichte der
Philosophie, 60 (1978), 1–26. R. F. Stalley o·ers a response to Moline in ‘Persuasion
and the Tripartite Soul in Plato’sRepublic’ [‘Persuasion’], Oxford Studies in Ancient
Philosophy, 32 (2007), 63–89 at 72–3.
14 For examples of the good-independent interpretation, see the works cited in
n. 2 above. Moss also confronts the good-independent interpretation in ‘Pleasure
and Illusion’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 72 (2006), 503–35.
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rect judgement. To borrow a nice example from Terry Penner,15
consider a case where a subject familiar with the M•uller-Lyer il-
lusion is subject to the illusion. The one line appears longer than
the other, though the subject is not wholly deceived—she correctly
judges on the basis of measurement that the two lines are the same
in length. The initial problem with examples of this sort is that
they do not seem to involve a conﬂict among beliefs, though Plato’s
argument clearly requires that they do so.16 The one line does in
some sense appear longer than the other, but ordinarily the subject
of this sort of illusion would not claim to believe that the one line
is longer than the other. She is not deceived by the appearance.
There is an obvious way of accommodating the idea that the
subject in this instance believes the one line to be longer than the
other. It is commonplace at least since Locke’s time to note that
belief comes in degrees.17 As Thomas Reid puts it, ‘Belief admits
of all degrees from the slightest suspicion to the fullest assurance.’18
Even when one has measured the lines carefully and is satisﬁed for
the purposes at hand that the two lines are equal in length, one
subject to the M•uller-Lyer illusion will reasonably place a very
slight degree of credence in the appearance to the contrary. After
all, our practices of measurement are hardly infallible. So here we
have a perfectly good sense in which one believes that the one line
is longer than the other—one believes it with a very low degree of
credence.
While this way of talking about belief is familiar in contempo-
rary epistemology, especially Bayesian epistemology, Plato is not
accustomed to thinking of belief as coming in such a wide range
of degrees. Furthermore, understanding the opposed belief in this
manner would not serve Plato’s purposes. First, the belief in ques-
tion is not opposed in any interesting sense to the belief that the lines
are the same in length.The two beliefs seem, rather, to complement
one another: believing with great conﬁdence that the lines are the
same in length involves believing with only a very low degree of
15 ‘Thought and Desire’, 102.
16 From the very beginning of his discussion of parts of the soul, Plato takes belief
and desire as his paradigm cases of mental states that can enter into conﬂict (see
437 b). A central premiss of Plato’s argument at 602–3 is the claim that we ﬁnd
opposed beliefs within ourselves.
17 SeeAn Essay concerning Human Understanding, ed. by P. H.Nidditch (Oxford,
1975), 4. 16.
18 Essays on the Intellectual Powers of Man (University Park, Pa., 2002), 228.
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credence that they di·er in length. Second, Plato is interested here
in identifying a form of non-rational belief, but the belief that the
one line is longer than the other is not non-rational in any obvious
way. This belief with a very low degree of credence is a reasonable
response to the evidence, which strongly suggests that the lines are
the same in length.
Amorenatural alternative is to take Plato’s talk of opposedbeliefs
as talk about outright believing, not believing to degree n, so it will be
useful to say a fewwords about this notion of outright believing (i.e.
believing full stop, without qualiﬁcation, or simpliciter). A person
may believe p to a certain degree—even a rather high degree—
without counting as outright believing p. What might be missing
in such cases? Perhaps outright believing p (in circumstance c19)
presupposes a willingness or disposition to act (in c) as if p. It is
plausible to suppose that something like this constraint on outright
belief is guiding our everyday practices of ascribing beliefs, that
we take a willingness or disposition to act (or behave20) as if p as a
necessary condition for outright believing p.
The more pressing issue for present purposes is whether Plato
takes a willingness or disposition to act as if p as su¶cient for out-
right believing p. Consider, ﬁrst, the possibility that Plato endorses
what I shall call an alethic notion of belief . On this way of think-
ing about belief, believing that p requires more than merely being
disposed to act as if p; one must also have the aim of believing
p only if p is true. According to the alethic account, beliefs are
products of goal-directed behaviour. Part of what makes some-
thing a belief is the way it comes about: beliefs are products of the
practices we engage in with the aim of determining how things
are. And precisely because believers qua believers have an aim
or goal in acquiring their beliefs, we are able to assess their ac-
tivities relative to this goal. An increase in conﬁdence is rational
when the increase is brought about by means that are generally
truth-conducive; an increase in conﬁdence is irrational when the
subject is aiming at truth in a manner that is not generally truth-
conducive.
19 I include this qualiﬁcation because there are some reasons to prefer a contextu-
alist view of belief attribution. The issue of whether we ought to endorse some form
of contextualism about belief is not relevant in the present context, so no further
mention of this qualiﬁcation will be made here.
20 I shall speak of acting and behaving interchangeably here, without distinction.
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Given his aims in book 10, Plato has good reason to avoid an
alethic conception of belief. For his purposes in establishing a dis-
tinction between rational and non-rational parts of the soul, Plato
needs to convince us that his examples of partially deceptive illu-
sions do in fact involve an opposition among beliefs. The problem
for Plato, noted at the outset, is that it is far from obvious that the
subject believes what her visual experience represents. After all,
the evidence strongly speaks against what vision reports. Think-
ing of believers qua believers as aiming at the truth, we have a
very hard time seeing how the subject outright believes the one
line to be longer than the other. She has only a very low degree
of conﬁdence in what vision reports—not nearly enough conﬁ-
dence to be willing to act as if the one line is longer than the
other and so not nearly enough conﬁdence to count as outright
believing.
Plato tells us that it is with the rational part of the soul that one
aims at the truth, that the rational part is ‘always wholly strain-
ing to know where the truth lies’ (581 b 5–6). Because beliefs of
the rational part arise in pursuit of truth, these beliefs are sub-
ject to assessment with respect to that goal, namely, as rational or
irrational. In his defence of the distinction between rational and
non-rational parts of the soul in book 10, Plato is attempting to
identify beliefs that arise independently of any aim towards truth,
beliefs that are not assessable as rational or irrational. Plato’s cen-
tral example of this sort of non-rational psychological state is a
sensory appearance. In the argument for parts of the soul at 602–3
Plato is suggesting that the appearance opposed to one’s calcula-
tion is itself a belief. Having a sensory appearance that p is quite
di·erent from believing p with the aim of believing only what is
true: the subject has no aim relative to which the former might be
assessed as rational or irrational. A subject’s sensory appearances
are only coincidentally related to her aiming at the truth. Sensory
appearances are brought about by a·ections of the body, the e·ects
of impinging bodies in the environment—not by strivings towards
the truth.
But why would Plato suppose that these sensory appearances
are themselves beliefs? In thinking about our non-rational side
Plato takes as a model the psychology of animals and small chil-
dren, who lack the cognitive sophistication required to be aim-
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ing at truth and goodness.21 If Plato is going to follow common
sense in appealing to beliefs and desires in explaining and predict-
ing the behaviour of these creatures, then he presumably needs
some alternative to the alethic conception of belief. But is it at all
plausible to ascribe beliefs to a creature that lacks the concept of
truth?
Wenaturally associate outrightbelievingwith asserting,22 as Plato
does at Sophist 263 e–264 b andTheaetetus 189 e–190 a, and it is far
from obvious that all asserting is asserting as true, where the latter
requires the concept of truth. Consider our sensory appearances or
sense-perceptions.23 It is plausible to think that they have an as-
sertoric character. Unlike the state of imagining that p, one’s very
state of perceiving that p seems in some sense to assert p and so can
be correct or incorrect in what it asserts. And presumably the kind
of asserting that occurs in perceiving by the senses is also present
in animals and young children, who do not possess any notion of
truth. Here we have a perfectly good sense in which one’s sense-
perception is itself a belief that stands opposed to one’s reasoned
judgement—reason is rejecting precisely what one’s perception as-
serts.
One might reasonably object that it makes little sense to speak
of assertion without an asserter, but Plato avoids this awkward-
ness by insisting that a part of the subject is doing the asserting.
Notice that this interpretation requires us to suppose that parts of
the soul are not just sources of belief; they can also be subjects of
belief.24
For those who are doubtful that Plato takes parts of the soul to be
subjects of psychological states, there are still other ways to make
sense of the idea that sensory appearances are themselves beliefs.
For example, Plato might say that a representation with the con-
tent p counts as a belief that p provided it disposes one to act as if
21 See 441 a–b for Plato’s insistence that reason is lacking in animals and young
children.
22 Asserting p is often taken as a paradigm instance of acting as if p. One might
suggest that asserting p (whether through an internal mental act or in a manner
detectable by others) is su¶cient for believing p, but that there are other ways of
acting as if p that are also su¶cient for believing p.
23 For present purposes it is not necessary to distinguish sensory appearances
and sense-perceptions. Note, though, that at Soph. 264 b appearance is said to be a
mixture of perception and belief.
24 Stalley, ‘Persuasion’, attempts to resist the natural temptation to think of Plato’s
parts as subjects of psychological states.
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p. On the assumption that Plato is working with some such non-
alethic view of belief, it makes perfect sense for him to suppose
that sensory appearances are beliefs. We can reasonably suppose
that our subject of a partially deceptive illusion has just such a dis-
position to act as though the one line is longer than the other. As
with all dispositions, this disposition can fail to be activated—the
disposition to act as if the one line is longer than the other can be
overriddenor overruled (as Plato puts it25) in favour of the opposing
disposition to act as if the lines are the same in length. No doubt
various unspeciﬁed factors determine which, if either, state guides
the subject’s behaviour. Nevertheless, one seems to have two op-
posed inclinations: one to act as if the lines are the same in length
and the other to act as if the one line is longer than the other. For
example, even someone with great conﬁdence in her measurement
may ﬁnd her visually guided behaviour dominated by how things
look. And here it is the subject—not a part of the subject—that is
so disposed.
This is not the place to defend the view that Plato takes parts
of the soul to be subjects of psychological states. Note, though,
how well this view ﬁts with the discussion in book 10. Book 4
prepares us for the idea that assenting and dissenting are opposed
mental states in just the same way that wanting and rejecting are
(437 b). Then in book 10 Plato ﬁnally o·ers examples of the former
type of conﬂict, cases of partially deceptive illusions. Based on
one’s rational calculation, one comes to reject what one’s sensory
experience asserts. Since the person as a whole is not making the
latter assertion, Plato reasonablyposits a subpersonal subject of the
psychological state in question, the non-rational part.
So far we have focused on Plato’s distinction between the ratio-
nal and non-rational in the context of the argument in book 10,
where Plato appeals to conﬂicts among beliefs. The same sort of
argument occurs in book 4, though Plato’s focus here is on the
case of desire. With his example of the thirsty non-drinker, Plato
hopes to establish a distinction between rational desires and non-
rational, appetitive ones. In distinguishing these forms of desire,
Plato emphasizes a di·erence in their origins:
Doesn’t that which forbids in such cases come into play—if it comes
into play at all—as a result of rational calculation, while what drives
25 See 602 d; cf. 439 c.
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and drags them to drink is a result of a·ections and diseases? (439 c 9–
d 2)26
Our appetitive desires are products of physiological changes—
bodily a·ections and diseases—whereas our rational desires are
due to reasoning or calculating. Rational desires are acquired on
the basis of reasons: they are products of our calculating and de-
liberating with the aim of pursuing what is best. By contrast, we
do not have appetites for drink, food, or sex because these things are
taken to be good. Indeed, in having appetites, we do not desire food,
drink, and sex as good things at all (438 a).
This distinction between being moved by calculation and being
moved by a·ection returns in book 10, where Plato is once again
arguing for a distinction between rational and non-rational desires.
Someone struck by personal tragedy is drawn by a·ection tomourn
openly, but reason resists the temptation (604 a 10–b 1). This better
part is moved by a rational calculation aimed at doing what is best
(604 b 6–d 6).
In his e·orts to distinguish rational and non-rational desires,
Plato seems to be working with a conception of desire that par-
allels his view of belief. Just as he rejects the idea that belief (by
its nature) aims at the true, Plato denies that desire (by its na-
ture) aims at the good. In spite of the fact that they arise quite
apart from the subject’s aim towards the good, appetites can read-
ily count as desires. For example, they might count as desires be-
cause of the role they play vis-›a-vis our behaviour, a role they
share with rational desires. Appetites and rational desires both
seem to be capable of moving us to act, so we might say that de-
siring A is just a matter of being disposed to choose or select A.
One need not judge that A is good or better than available alter-
natives.
In sum, the central di·erence between the psychological states of
the rational part and those of the non-rational part lies in their ori-
gins. Desires and beliefs of the rational part come about through the
activities of seeking goodness and truth, respectively. When these
goals are pursued by means that are generally e·ective, the beliefs
and desires that arise are rational; otherwise they are irrational.
Non-rational beliefs and desires do not issue from the subject’s ef-
26 Here I have modiﬁed slightly the Grube–Reeve translation in J. M. Cooper
(ed.), Plato: Complete Works (Indianapolis, 1992).
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forts to pursue aims or goals. Rather, they are due to physiological
changes—bodily a·ections and diseases.
This idea in the Republic that our appetites are products of af-
fections and diseases is one that Plato develops further in the Phile-
bus andTimaeus. Consider ﬁrst the discussion at Philebus 35, where
Plato describes how appetites arise in response to a·ections of the
body.27 He distinguishes two stages of cognition involved in ap-
petite formation:
(1) An a·ection of the body that upsets the natural condition
of the body gives rise to a perception of that a·ection. The
perception is pain; the a·ection is painful.
(2) The perception of this painful a·ection (i.e. pain) triggers a
memory of an opposite a·ection previously cognized by way
of perception. This opposite a·ection restores the natural
condition of the body and it is pleasant when perceived.
The desire that results from this two-stage process is a desire for
the pleasant a·ection that is a returning to or restoringof the body’s
natural condition, an a·ection cognized by way of memory. Take
the case of thirst. A depletion of the body gives rise to a perception
of this unpleasant a·ection of the body. This perception in turn
gives rise to a memory of the opposite a·ection, the ﬁlling that
restores the natural condition of the body. The appetite we call
thirst is a desire for this pleasant ﬁlling.
This account of appetite formation helps us understand Plato’s
claim at Timaeus 70 d–71 a that appetites are aimed at the well-
being of the body—the only exceptions being due to disease and
other related corruptions (86 d–e). The appetitive part aims at
bodily health only in the sense that its desires are teleologically
ordered to this goal: we are designed in such a way that we natu-
rally desire a·ections which restore the healthy state of the body.28
As the Philebusmakes clear, the process of appetite formation takes
place independently of any grasp of the aim (bodily health) as such.
The only forms of cognition involved are perception of a bodily
27 My discussion here draws on two papers I have written on related topics: ‘Ap-
petitive Desire inLater Plato’ [‘Appetitive Desire’],History of Philosophy Quarterly,
18 (2001), 227–37, and ‘ThePlatonic Approach to Sense-Perception’ [‘Platonic Ap-
proach’], History of Philosophy Quarterly, 22 (2005), 1–15.
28 In ‘Appetitive Desire’ I argue that Plato introduced the idea that appetitive
desires are teleologically ordered to bodily health in order to respond to the worry
that there is insu¶cient unity to the desires of the appetitive part.
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a·ection and a memory of the opposed a·ection (previously cog-
nized by perception).
It is worth noting, ﬁnally, that sense-perceptions—the cognitive
states whichPlato consistently29 attributes to the appetitive part30—
are also products of bodily a·ections. Throughouthismajor discus-
sions of the nature of sense-perception in the Theaetetus, Timaeus,
and Philebus, Plato consistently maintains that sense-perceptions
are brought about by a·ections (Theaet. 179 c; Tim. 42 a; Phileb.
34 a),31 which are physical changes in the perceiving subject’s body
brought about by impinging external bodies (see Phileb. 33 d; Tim.
42 a; Theaet. 186 c).32 Accordingly, sense-perceptions and appe-
tites, the two psychological states Plato attributes to the appetitive
part at Timaeus 77 b, are both brought about by alterations in our
bodies, not by strivings for truth or goodness.
II
Moss and I have rather di·erent views about what makes our non-
rational side33 non-rational.On my reading, the relevant desires and
beliefs are non-rational precisely because they arise independently
of the subject’s strivings for goodness and truth. For Moss, on the
other hand, the non-rational side desires what it does because it is
taken to be good and believes what it does because it is taken to be true,
and so its aims are not unlike those of the rational part. However,
Moss should not say that they have the same aims, exactly. Since the
29 Plato clearly changed his view about what cognitive states the appetitive part
can enjoy. The claim in the Republic that the appetitive part has beliefs is ultimately
rejected at Tim. 77 b. This change of view goes hand in hand with his coming to
accept an alethic notion of belief. See Soph. 263 e–264 b and Theaet. 189 e–190 a,
where Plato deﬁnes belief as a conclusion drawn when thinking through a question
about how things are. Plato consistently denies that the appetitive part aims at truth.
When he decides that believing involves aiming at the truth, Plato has to give up on
the idea that the appetitive part has beliefs. Though his interpretation is quite dif-
ferent in the details, Lorenz agrees that Plato gave up on the idea that the appetitive
part has beliefs because he changed his view about what believing involves. See The
Brute Within, ch. 6.
30 For the claim that the appetitive part has sense-perceptions, see Tim. 77 b.
31 These same a·ections are also objects of sense-perception (Theaet. 186 c; Tim.
64 d; Phileb. 33 e–34 a), a point I explore at length in ‘Platonic Approach’.
32 For a full defence of this last point see ‘Platonic Approach’.
33 I follow Moss in thinking that the non-rational side distinguished from the
rational part in book 10 includes both the appetitive and spirited parts. See ‘Ap-
pearances and Calculations’, 41–6.
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rational part is capable of weighing goodness and evidence, Plato
would do well to say that the rational part aims to desiremore what
is better and to put greater credence in what is more likely.34 The
latter aims are clearly not ones that our non-rational side can aspire
towards, since it is incapable of any sort of weighing. This inability
to transcend appearances by weighing or calculating is what makes
our non-rational part non-rational, on Moss’s view.
There is something deeply puzzling about non-rational cogni-
tion, on Moss’s reading. Our non-rational side accepts things as
true, just as it desires things as good, so it must have some concep-
tion of truth, howeverminimal. But in order for a creature to have a
notion of truth or falsity, at the very least the creature must be able
to draw a distinction between its representational states and how
things are. Accordingly, it is problematic for Moss also to suppose
that our non-rational side has no understandingof anything beyond
appearances. Grasping the idea of how things are—what is true—is
beyond a creature that draws no distinction between appearance
and reality. Hence, it makes little sense to suppose that a subject
wholly restricted to appearances accepts things as true.
On the reading of Plato I prefer, our non-rational side is the
source and subject of sense-perceptionswith anassertoric character,
but it does not endorse anything as true. On Moss’s reading, by
contrast, the appetitive part accepts appearances as true, just as it
cognizes pleasant things as good. The problem, I have suggested,
is that the appetitive part does not seem to be in a position to accept
things as true. The appetitive part is supposed to be incapable
of transcending sensory appearances in its cognition, so it would
seem to have no grasp of the distinction between representation
and reality. It lacks the bare minimum required for possessing the
concept of truth.
My second worry about Moss’s interpretation is largely a termi-
nological point. Moss takes Plato to be drawing a distinction be-
tween the rational and non-rational, but the distinction she draws is
more naturally labelled a distinction between rational psychologi-
cal states and irrational ones. To accept appearances unreﬂectively,
without any weighing of the evidence, is to employ a poor strategy
for getting at the truth. A subject employing this means for getting
at the truth would be irrational. Recall that accepting p with the
34 More precisely, the rational part aims to have its degree of conﬁdence well
calibrated to the evidence.
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aim of believing what is true is very di·erent frommerely having a
sensory appearance with the content p: in merely having a sensory
appearance one is not subject to criticism as rational or irrational.
What accounts for this di·erence? When there is an end or aim in
place, it makes sense to praise activity that is generally conducive
to that end and criticize what is not, and no relevant aim is present
in the case of simply enjoying a sensory appearance. On the other
hand, in the case of being moved to accept p because it appears that
p, one has an aim in accepting p: one is aiming to believe what is
true. Given this aim, the practice of always unreﬂectively accepting
appearances is an irrational one.
This terminological point leads to a more serious worry. Plato
defends his partitioning of the soul by appeal to cases of mental
conﬂict such as the conﬂicts among beliefs discussed in book 10.
OnMoss’s readingof book10, these turn out to be conﬂicts between
rational and irrational beliefs. The worry is that this argumentative
strategy will yield more parts than Plato wants. The rational part
too can endorse things unreﬂectively or otherwise fail to respond to
the evidence appropriately, so there is nothing to prevent a conﬂict
within the rational part that parallels exactly the sort of conﬂict
Moss ﬁndsbetween our rational and non-rational sides. This sort of
problemdoes not arise formy preferred reading, according to which
Plato is interested in conﬂicts between rational and non-rational
beliefs. The rational part’s beliefs will never be non-rational, for,
as Plato emphasizes, the rational part is always aiming towards
the truth.
My next objection to Moss’s interpretation is perhaps the most
serious. Plato’s argument for a division of the soul in book 10 is a
poor argument, if we interpret it as Moss does. Plato begins with
the idea that in having partially deceptive illusions we ﬁnd within
ourselves a conﬂict among our beliefs. According to Moss, this
conﬂict will be a conﬂict between two states both of which came
about with the aim of ﬁnding out how things are: one deriving
from calculation and measurement, the other restricted merely to
appearances. The problem is that one simply does not ﬁnd a belief
of the latter sort within oneself. On the assumption that one places
a great deal of credence in one’s calculation, one will have only the
slightest suspicion that one’s calculation is mistaken. Qua believer
aiming at the truth, one lacks the degree of conﬁdence needed to
count as outright believing what the illusory experience reports
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(i.e. conﬁdence enough to be willing to act in accord with what
one’s experience reports). Accordingly, Plato’s argument cannot
get started: we do not ﬁnd the opposition among our beliefs that
the argument requires.
To see more clearly the problem at hand, keep in mind that
the belief opposed to one’s calculation is irrational (arrived at by
unreﬂectively accepting one’s sensory appearance) and recalcitrant
(staying put even though the evidence speaks decisively against
the appearance).35 Typically, when one discovers that one’s belief
that p was ill-formed and that the evidence speaks against p, one
loses one’s conﬁdence in p. Returning to our example involving
the M•uller-Lyer illusion, once the calculations have been carried
out one loses all inclination to endorse as true what vision reports.
All that persists is the sensory appearance, which one takes to be
illusory. Plato needs a case of synchronic opposition among one’s
beliefs, and Moss’s reading fails to deliver.
The same sort of problem faces Moss’s reading of Plato’s argu-
ment in book 4. According to Moss, the upshot of the argument is
that we each have two parts aiming at goodness, though one of them
is better equipped to hit the target. But how does the case of the
thirsty non-drinker help to support this conclusion? Presumably
the sort of case Plato has in mind is one where the reasons available
to the thirsty non-drinker speak decisively against drinking. (These
are the reasons that motivate the subject to abstain from drinking.)
The subject in this sort of case correctly assesses the value of the
pleasures involved in drinking (along with the pains involved in
not drinking), and determines that the goodness of not drinking
overwhelms the goodness of the pleasures that stem from drink-
ing now. A persistent, powerful desire for drink will not be viewed
by the subject as a desire for drink as good. From the subject’s
point of view the value of drinking at this time is relatively slight.
The subject does not ﬁnd herself conﬂicted about the goodness of
her options (drinking vs. abstaining from drink), so how does this
sort of case provide evidence for two parts each striving towards
goodness? Why would Plato interpret the conﬂict in this manner?
Finally, Moss’s view of the non-rational part as aiming at good-
ness does not sit well with what Plato actually says in book 4. On
Moss’s reading, appetites are products of (ill-informed) aiming to-
wards the good. Accordingly, when Plato states that our appetites
35 See 602 e.
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are caused by a·ections and diseases (439 c 9–d 2), he will have to
mean that a·ections and diseases give rise to appearances of good-
ness, which in turn produce appetites such as thirst and hunger.
But it would be very odd for Plato to expect his readers to think
of appetites as due to aiming at goodness when he says that they
come about from a·ections and diseases—especially in this con-
text where he has just made a special point of denying that desires
always aim at good things (438 a).
OnMoss’s account, then, Plato is defending an unattractive view
of the beast within: the non-rational part is not cognitively sophis-
ticated enough to have the goals that it is supposed to have, and
Plato has no plausible argument for the existence of a part with
these aims. By contrast, Plato’s argument is quite powerful when
interpreted in the manner I have suggested. I elaborate on this
point in the following section.
III
At ﬁrst glance, Plato’s argument for a distinction between rational
and non-rational cognition in book 10 is rather curious. Philoso-
phers sometimes appeal to the sorts of illusion Plato has in mind
in order to cast doubt on the idea that sense-perception requires
belief. They argue that one can be subject, for example, to the
M•uller-Lyer illusion, seeing the one line as longer than the other,
without believing that the line is longer than the other.36With such
an obvious point in mind, it is initially puzzling to ﬁnd Plato in-
sisting that such illusory appearances are themselves beliefs.
This prima facie worry about Plato’s argument dissolves upon
closer inspection. What is driving Plato’s argument is the obser-
vation that we sometimes have reason to reject what our sensory
experience is asserting about the world. These simultaneous acts
of assent and dissent are supposed to parallel the simultaneous acts
of wanting and rejecting discussed in book 4. We might not ﬁnd
it entirely natural to describe this sort of cognitive dissonance as
a matter of conﬂict among beliefs, but there are a couple points to
keep in mind. First, we can restate Plato’s argument in terms of
assent and dissent rather than belief and disbelief without com-
36 See e.g. J. L.Berm‹udez, ‘Nonconceptual Content: FromPerceptual Experience
to Subpersonal Computational States’,Mind@Language, 10 (1995), 333–69 at 335.
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promising the argument in any way. Indeed, Plato himself prefers
the former way of talking about cognitive conﬂict at 437 b. Second,
Plato takes belief to be a kind of assent (Soph. 263 e–264 b and
Theaet. 189 e–190 a). If we adopt this way of thinking about belief,
our initial resistance to the idea that we are dealing with conﬂict
among beliefs fades.
Of course, we might have lingering doubts about the suggestion
that Plato’s examples of partially deceptive illusions involve con-
ﬂicting acts of assent. Even if we allow that sensory experiences
have an assertoric character, it is still far from obvious that any
literal assenting is taking place here—the sort of thing that might
genuinely come into conﬂict with one’s considered judgement.
These lingering doubts are lessened if we keep in mind the ex-
planatory power of the hypothesis that our sensory experiences
involve assent in the familiar sense. Consider ﬁrst the role that sen-
sory experiences play in justifying our beliefs about how things
are in our surroundings. Sense-perceptions seem especially well
suited to this task precisely because they seem to be telling us what
is going on around us. And because sensory experiences, unlike
imaginings, are assertions, they can be mistaken in what they tell
us, as in Plato’s examples of illusions. Further, sense-perceptions
are able to guide behaviour, just as judgements are. Perhaps they
are both able to play this role because of their shared assertoric
character. On the plausible assumption that sense-perceptions, like
beliefs, can serve as premisses of action-yielding practical syllo-
gisms, it is natural to think of sense-perceptions as assertions. The
premisses of such practical syllogisms are not merely entertained
propositions. Presumably the premisses are assertions.
In Plato’s examples of partially deceptive illusions, the person
does not assent to the false content. The lack of any obvious candi-
date for the role of assentermight seem tomake trouble for the view
that sense-perception involves assent, but Plato makes an ingenious
move to accommodate our intuition that assent presupposes an as-
senter, positing a non-rational part that is the source and subject of
our non-rational psychological states.
No less ingenious is Plato’s manner of distinguishing between
rational and non-rational cognition. One of the striking features of
these acts of assent that are opposed to our considered judgements
is how insulated they are from praise and blame: one is not called
reasonable or unreasonable in having these sensory states. Plato’s
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remarkable suggestion is that this di·erence is grounded in a dif-
ference in the origins of these kinds of assent. Because the judge-
ments that stand in opposition towhat our senses report come about
with the goal of arriving at the truth, they can be assessed relative to
that goal: they are rational when they come about in a manner that
is generally e·ective for attaining the goal; otherwise they count as
irrational. By contrast, our sensory states are products of physical
changes in the body due to interaction with our surroundings.
Plato’s way of contrasting the rational and non-rational becomes
all themore compelling when we see how naturally it extends to the
case of desire. Consider again Plato’s example of someone who re-
jects an appetite for drink as bad, all things considered. This desire
opposed to one’s appetite can be praised as rational or condemned
as irrational, but no one counts as reasonable or unreasonable in
virtue of being thirsty. What accounts for this di·erence? In reject-
ing one’s appetite for drink, one has a goal relative to which this
inclination to refrain from drinking can be assessed, namely, the
goal of attaining the best available outcome. One can pursue this
end by means that are generally e·ective or one can do so by means
that are generally ine·ective. In the former case the resulting de-
sire is rational; in the latter the desire is irrational. On the other
hand, our appetites come about through physiological changes, not
through pursuit of any goals. Accordingly, they cannot be similarly
assessed. Of course, this is not to say that appetites are beyond
reproach. Due to their independence from reason, appetites are
sometimes dangerous, wild, and lawless (Republic 571–2).
We can now see that Julia Annas was too quick in the following
dismissal of Plato’s argument in book 10:
Plato presumably fails to see that his argument will not work, that desire
has nothing to do with optical illusions, because he thinks of the lower part
of the soul as being merely the trashy and reason-resisting part.37
Plato is working with a much richer, more cohesive conception of
our non-rational side than Annas suggests. Once we understand
how Plato is distinguishing the rational and non-rational, we are
able to appreciate just how powerful his arguments in favour of the
distinction are.
Oberlin College, Ohio
37 Introduction, 339.
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